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In 2015 the Conservative government has approved the creation of five Extended 
Ministerial Offices (EMOs), enabling ministers to recruit more special advisers and 
temporary civil servants. This development, which has gone unreported by the media, was 
unearthed by Athanassios Gouglas. In this post he and Marleen Brans explain the 





On 27 November 2013 the UK government agreed that Secretaries of State and other 
ministerial heads of departments may appoint an Extended Ministerial Office (EMO). The 
development was the brainchild of Cabinet Office Minister Francis Maude, and announced 
in the Cabinet Office report ‘Civil Service Reform Plan: One Year On’, which was 
published in July 2013. It came as a follow up to a June 2013 report commissioned by 
Francis Maude from the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) titled ‘Accountability 
and Responsiveness in the Senior Civil Service’. The rationale was that British government 
ministers are significantly under-supported in comparison with other countries, including 
those within the Westminster administrative tradition. Some media outlets presented the 
decision as a mini revolution with ministers getting new powers to appoint at their own 
discretion the civil servants and staff who will work in larger ministerial offices. In view 
of establishing extended ministerial offices under coalition government executive politics, 
the question was quickly raised as to whether the UK was moving down the road of 
establishing a ministerial cabinet system? 
 
According to Yong and Hazell (2014, pp. 162-163), ‘suggestions to adopt a cabinet system 
have been a staple since the 1960s’, only for the idea to be quickly dismissed every time. 
EMOs are ‘one more variant on this theme’ (p. 198). Is this the case or do EMOs constitute 
a qualitative departure from what has been happening during the last 30 years? We assess 
this using the concept of cabinetisation, put forward in a recent paper by Gouglas, Brans 
and Jaspers (2015). Gouglas et al. have argued that we may be observing a process of 
‘cabinetisation’ in non-ministerial cabinet systems of both the Westminster and continental 
traditions, which started in the 1980s and continues unabated till today, though its direction 
and intensity is neither uniform, nor equally intense across countries and time. 
Cabinetisation is a process by which that part of the ‘internal to government’ policy 
advisory system (as defined by Halligan 1995), which comprises ministerial offices, 
evolves towards or fully develops into a ministerial cabinet system. This process of 
‘cabinetisation’ consists of the following developments: 
 
1. The formal establishment of relatively big ministerial offices, comprising a 
mixture of civil servants and external appointees performing advisory duties. 
2. Increased discretion and flexibility on behalf of ministers to organise their office 
and recruit their staff, whether external appointees or civil servants. 
3. The widening of the scope of ministerial office advisers’ policy work 
(colonisation of the policy cycle, policy management, coordination), including their 
ability to speak and negotiate on behalf of the minister, and give a steer to civil servants. 
4. The ability of both external appointees and civil servants to pursue careers as 
advisers, without this hindering their progression or return to their past position. 
5. Greater distance between the ministerial office and the department. 
6. Increased politicisation which is evident both as increased pressure towards the 
administration for political responsiveness (and more blurred politico-administrative 
boundaries), as well as involvement with civil service appointments. 
Empirical data on policy advisory systems and political advisers in ministerial offices 
across countries reveals that cabinetisation has been more advanced in Australia and 
Canada, but not so much in the UK and New Zealand (Craft 2012,Eichbaum and Shaw 
2010, Halligan 2015, Maley 2015, Yong and Hazell 2014). Yet, the recent introduction of 
extended ministerial offices in the UK calls this into question. The examination of the UK 
government’s Ministerial Code and Extended Ministerial Offices – Guidance for 
Departments, as well as the Civil Service Commission’s new rules on exceptions 
concerning recruitment to EMOs, provide evidence of what may be regarded as a de 
jure process of cabinetisation, especially in terms of size and configuration of ministerial 
offices (point 1 above), ministerial discretion and flexibility in terms of staff management 
(2) and widening of advisers’ policy roles (3). On all those fronts, we observe that the 
provisions concerning EMOs are loosely similar to those found on Decrees establishing 
ministerial cabinets in the Napoleonic administrative tradition countries. 
 
To begin with, more integrated and bigger ministerial offices are formalised under the 
name of Extended Ministerial Office (EMO). This formalisation has survived the transition 
from coalition to majority government, as well as the departure from the Cabinet Office of 
the EMO founder, Francis Maude. According to point 3.5 of the 2015 Ministerial 
Code ‘Secretaries of State and other Ministerial heads of departments may have an 
Extended Ministerial Office’, which according to the latest government guidelines on 
EMOs are made up of a mixture of civil servants, special advisers and external appointees 
with temporary civil servant status. Moreover, ministers are given greater flexibility and 
discretion in managing their office by being able to ‘decide to retain direct and full 
responsibility for appointments and management of staff in EMOs’ (Extended Ministerial 
Offices – Guidance for Departments). More importantly, ministers can recruit external 
appointees, as civil servants who are brought in without fair and open competition. Some 
have argued that these political civil servants, unlike existing special advisers who are 
political aides, would have the power to give orders to other officials. While there is no 
such explicit formal provision, the new actors’ civil service status could potentially widen 
those actors’ discretionary authority, raising questions as to the boundaries of their political 
and policy work vis-á-vis the administration, much like the situation we observe in 
ministerial cabinet systems. 
 
Where EMO formal provisions are fundamentally different from what we would expect 
under the cabinetisation hypothesis is on the opportunities for an advisory career without 
restrictions in a ministerial office (4). As the correspondence in relation to EMOsshows, 
Francis Maude tried to do away with the provision for a single non-renewable five year 
term in order to give the opportunity to political civil servants to continue their work across 
more than one parliament. This was regarded as unacceptable by the Civil Service 
Commission on the ground that it is against the intention of the 2010 Constitutional Reform 
and Governance Act (which put regulation of the civil service onto a statutory footing). It 
could potentially open the way for appointing permanent civil servants without fair 
competition. In this respect, the fundamental balance in terms of advisory careers is 
preserved. Political civil servants can have no future in the professional political advisory 
market. At the same time, civil servants who become special advisers do not return to the 
civil service, while the work of special advisers retains its characteristics as a ‘mini 
profession, precarious, with high turnover, little training and no promotion chances’ (Yong 
and Hazell 2014, p.207). 
 
In view of the above developments, the question was raised as to whether ministers will 
want an EMO? Given the perceived need of the political executive for greater external 
support, we would expect many of them to have established such offices. In so doing we 
would consequently expect to see signs of a de facto cabinetisation of the British ‘internal 
to government’ policy advisory system, with increasing distance between ministerial 
offices and line departments (5), a tendency towards politicisation of appointments and 
greater pressures for political responsiveness (6). 
 
Yet, during the coalition government the establishment of EMOs did not advance. As 
Hazell (2014, p. 198) informs us there are ‘several twists in the tail of ministers who want 
an EMO’. First, EMO proposals need to be agreed with their Permanent Secretary and then 
approved by the Prime Minister. These are two veto points not to be found in cabinet 
systems, the exception being when ministers place requests for an increase in the size of 
their cabinet. Second, at least one member of the EMO needs to report back to Downing 
Street on implementation issues. This is what Robert Hazell coined as the ‘downing street 
nark’, enough to put off most ministers from wanting to set up EMOs. Finally, potential 
requests on behalf of Secretaries of State must also include proposals for strengthening 
support to junior ministers, which was especially a put-off during the coalition government. 
 
While these provisions explain why EMOs were not taken up immediately, the 
fundamental challenge to ‘cabinetisation’ in the UK is that cabinets ‘raise the spectre of 
politicisation’ and of ‘difficulties in times of political transition’ (Yong and Hazell 2014, 
p. 165). Cabinets are widely discredited by both the civil service and many politicians as 
problematic because of their potential impact on the relationship between the executive and 
the career bureaucracy. More than anything cabinetisation seems to run counter to a deeply 
engrained tradition of civil service neutrality and impartiality, which is resisting change 
much more successfully than did the systems in Canada or Australia. 
Yet, as was the case with other systems who moved further down the road of cabinetisation, 
the fundamental forces pushing in this direction are always there: the need for greater 
political and expert policy support, more political control over policy and, last but least, 
the quest for political bodyguards whose job is to shield the executive from political and 
media criticism. In July 2013, the idea won praise from politicians from across whole 
political party spectrum in the UK, which shows that EMOs do have a broad base of support 
within the political class. In January 2015 EMOs appeared in the media as being scuppered 
by Downing Street, yet in July 2015 the Education Secretary, Nicky Morgan, was 
reported to be ‘leading a group of cabinet ministers who want to use contentious powers to 
handpick civil servants and bring in outside experts in the face of opposition from 
Whitehall’. Following up on the take of EMOs by government ministers, we found out that 
such offices ‘have been approved and are being established in the Cabinet Office, the 
Department for Communities and Local Government, the Department for Education, the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and the Scotland Office’ 
(FOI322142-12/01/2016). 
 
Where does this leave cabinetisation in the UK then? First, the rules are there for the 
establishment of a cabinet system, though a distinctively British one through the specific 
provisions regarding Extended Ministerial Offices. Second, beyond the statutory 
framework, cabinetisation seems to be actually taking place with the Cabinet Office and 
four Secretaries of State currently in the process of establishing EMOs. The British 
government policy advisory system is moving further along the road to cabinetisation. Yet, 
the road is bumpy and long. It may be argued it is a case of extremely slow and gradual 
cabinetisation through layering: the construction of a new institution alongside similar 
existing ones. It is difficult to predict whether it will endure; but so far the direction of 
travel has been all one way. 
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